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Foreign Securities: Integration and Disclosure Under
the Securities and Exchange Acts
As world trade has increased in the last twenty-five years, many
corporations have taken a more international view toward sources of
capital.' While American corporations have sought capital abroad,
many foreign corporations have entered the United States capital
markets to secure short and long-term financing. Thus, the value of
foreign securities held by United States citizens rose from $19.6 bil-
lion in 1970 to over $62.1 billion in 1980.2 This note examines how
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has responded to in-
creased foreign securities trade and how it has balanced the problems
foreign issuers face versus the need for investor protection. This note
also argues that the American investor would be better served by a
system that would encourage foreign offerings and permit a wide
range of investment vehicles. Part I examines the foreign securities
markets in the United States. Part II reviews the SEC regulatory
history regarding foreign securities. Part III explains and analyzes
the recent SEC regulatory response including the integration of the
Securities Act and Securities Exchange Act regulations.
I. Foreign Securities Trade
The American investor may acquire foreign securities in four
basic forms: 1) "ordinary" securities-issued in the foreign country of
origin;3 2) "American" securities-issued specifically for the Ameri-
can market with procedural rights differing from "ordinary" securi-
ties;4 3) American Depository Receipts (ADR)-issued by an
I International world trade increased from $128.3 million in 1970 to $2,068.7 million in
1980. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, HANDBOOK OF IN-
TERNATIONAL TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT STATISTICS 1981 SUPPLEMENT 2 (1982).
2 Thomas, Internationalization of the Securities Markets: An Empirical Analysis, 50 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 155, 159 (1982). This note will not analyze the regulatory scheme applicable
to Canadian issuers or foreign governmental entities as they are subject to differing regulatory
requirements. All references to foreign corporations mean non-Canadian, foreign, private
corporations.
3 The ordinary security may be in bearer or registered form. All dividends or interest
are paid in a foreign currency. Registered securities must often be sent out of the United
States to transfer ownership. See Moxley, The ADR: An Instrument of International Finance and a
Tool ofArbitrage, 8 VILL. L. REV. 19, 20-1 (1962). Some United States brokerage firms will
automatically collect foreign currency payments and convert them into dollars.
4 "American" securities are typically issued in registered form and have an American
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American bank and representing the underlying "ordinary" secur-
ity;5 and 4) American investment funds-a domestic holding com-
pany which holds the foreign "ordinary" security. 6 An American
investor can purchase these foreign securities in three major markets
either directly or through an American broker/dealer: 1) the original
foreign market-where the investor pays higher transaction CoStS; 7 2)
the American over-the-counter market-through the active National
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation(NASDAQ)
system or through the inactive National Daily Quotation Sheets, the
"pink sheet" market;8 and 3) the American national security ex-
changes-where active and widely held foreign securities can be
purchased.9
Foreign debt securities, known as "Yankee" bonds, comprise the
majority of the foreign securities market.'0 Foreign governmental is-
suers dominate this bond market but foreign corporate issuers have
recently become more active." These issuers seek two primary bene-
fits from the "Yankee" bond market: relatively low financing costs
transfer agent. They are normally denominated in dollars and pay interest or dividends in
dollars. See Tomlinson, Federal Regulation of Seconday Trading in Foreign Securities, 32 Bus. LAW.
463, 464 (1977).
5 The ADR is a "certificate, denominated in shares, representing proof of ownership of
foreign securities on deposit with a foreign depository bank affiliated with an American
bank." Tomlinson, supra note 4, at 464-65. The American bank acts as a transfer and collec-
tion agent, and converts payments into dollars. Id See also Moxley, supra note 3; Note, SEC
Regulation of American Depositoy Receipts: Disclosure Ltd., 65 YALE L. REv. 862 (1956).
6 At least fifteen investment funds concentrate on foreign securities, either world-wide or
from a specific geographic region. Thomas, supra note 2, at 162-63.
7 The American investor must pay a "foreign brokerage commission, currency conver-
sion charges, cable and shipping charges, and any taxes and exchange controls imposed in the
foreign market." Id. at 171.
8 NASDAQ links approximately 1,000 marketmakers and 3,500 dealers by a sophisti-
cated quotation system which permits current quotations on a substantial number of over-
the-counter securities. The National Daily Quotation Sheets or "pink sheets" also reflect quo-
tations, but on a non-current basis. H. BLOOMENTHAL, 1981 SECURrriIs LAw HANDBOOK
§ 3.02 (1981). See note 64 infra.
9 Twenty-four non-Canadian foreign issuers are listed on the New York Stock Ex-
change. Derived from NEw YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, DIRECTORY (revised to August 1,
1982). Twelve non-Canadian issuers are listed on the American Stock Exchange. Derived
from STANDARD & POOR'S, STOCK REPORTS-AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE (Nov. 1982).
See Thomas, supra note 2, at 166 (approximately 55 non-Canadian foreign issuers listed on
any United States exchange). See also SEC, ANNUAL REPORT 1980, 128 (1980)(value of all
foreign stocks and bonds traded on United States exchanges equals $64,919 million).
10 Foreign corporate and governmental issuers raised $3.8 billion of debt capital in 1982.
Investment Dealers Digest 5 (Jan. 11, 1983). From 1976 to 1980, foreign issuers, including gov-
ernment entities, raised $13.7 billion of debt capital while raising only $1.4 billion of equity
capital. Thomas, supra note 2, at 182.
11 Only three non-Canadian foreign corporate issuers raised non-convertible debt in the
United States from 1974 to 1980. Coles, Foreign Companies Raising Capital in the United States, 3
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and readily available long-term maturities.1 2 The major American
purchasers are institutional investors seeking risk diversification and
attracted by the slight interest premium "Yankee" bonds carry. 13
These institutional investors usually have direct access to the compet-
ing Eurobond market. Thus, the "Yankee" bond market and the
Eurobond market have overlapping roles. 14
Equity securities play a smaller but more visible role.15 Foreign
corporations have diverse reasons for entering the United States stock
markets. 16 Some issuers seek the better stock prices paid by sophisti-
cated American investors who value their stock more highly. Other
issuers wish to use capital from the American market or newly issued
stock to acquire American companies. Others seek to diversify
financing sources or create employee stock option plans for American
employees.
In addition to foreign corporations who voluntarily enter the
United States markets by issuing new stock, other foreign corpora-
tions have stock traded in United States secondary markets. Some
foreign corporations either avoid or actively discourage American
trading in their shares. These corporations' shares are normally
J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 300, 302 (1981). See also Thomas, spra note 2, at 183 (only
$400 million raised by non-Canadian foreign corporate issuers from 1976 to 1980).
12 Interest rates are often slightly lower than a Eurobond issue and "Yankee" bonds can
carry maturities often years or longer. Coles, supira note 11, at 304 (1981). See also Thomas,
supra note 2, at 183 ($300 million of "Yankee" bonds had maturities of 8 to 15 years while
$200 million of "Yankee" bonds had maturities of over 15 years).
13 The "foreign" premium on "Yankee" bonds is approximately 60 basis points. Coles,
supra note 11, at 106; ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
FINANCIAL MARKET TRENDS 37 (Nov. 1982). Institutions purchase the majority of "Yankee"
bonds. Coles, supra note 11, at 108. Many institutions have discovered that international
diversification can reduce overall risk. Solnik & Noetzlin, Optimal International Asset Allocation,
9 J. PORTFOLIO MGT. 11 (1982); Agmon & Lessard, Investor Recognition of Corporate International
Diversifration, 32 J. FIN. 104 (1977); H. BLOOMENTHAL, 3B SEC. AND FED. CORP. L. § 15.07
(rev. ed. 1982).
14 Coles, supra note 11, at 304; Williams & Spencer, Regulation of International Securities
Markets: Towards a Greater Cooperation, 4 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG 55 (1982).
15 Foreign corporations, including Canadian corporations, raised only $138.6 million of
equity capital in 1982. Investment Dealers Digest 6 (Jan. 11, 1982). See also note 10 supra. How-
ever, the interest shown in trading foreign securities can be demonstrated by the coverage
increasingly given them by the investment services. For example, Moody's International
Manual lists more than 3000 foreign corporations and governmental entities. MOODY'S IN-
TERNATIONAL MANUAL (1982). The more widely read Moody's Industrial Manual gives in-
formation on more than 135 major foreign corporations. 2 MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL
5851-6205 (1982). The Value Line Investment Survey, orientated toward individual inves-
tors, covers 18 foreign stocks in a new separate section. VALUE LINE INVESTMENT SURVEY
(1982).
16 Coles, supra note 11, at 313; Note, Neutralizing the Regulatory Burden- The Use of Equily
Securities by Foreign Corporate Acquirers, 89 YALE L.J. 1413 (1980).
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traded on the inactive "pink sheet" market.1 7 Other foreign corpora-
tions actively work to develop an American trading market by ob-
taining a national exchange listing or by entering the NASDAQ
system. 18
Again, institutional investors are the primary purchasers of for-
eign equity.' 9 They seek to diversify portfolio risk and enjoy the
higher expected return available in some foreign stocks.20 However,
individual investors are the predominant trading force in American
markets for foreign securities.21 They account for over one-half the
value and volume traded on the United States exchanges and over-
the-counter markets.22 The institutional investors' direct access to
foreign markets accounts for this apparent anomaly.
II. The Old SEC Regulatory Scheme
The Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act)2 3 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)24 are the primary statutory
bases for the SEC's regulation of foreign securities.25 When enacting
the Securities Act, Congress debated a proposal to provide a double
17 Stephens, Reevaluation of Disclosure Requirementsfor Foreign Issuers: Securities Act of 1934, 45
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 494, 509, 540 (1977). See also note 8 supra.
18 Foreign issuers must request a listing on a national stock exchange and agree to the
exchange's disclosure requirements. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, COMPANY MANUAL
§ B- 117 (1976). For example, the New York Stock Exchange requires more disclosure than
the SEC in a few areas. 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 23,095 (1982) (comparison of SEC and
New York Stock Exchange disclosure requirements). See also Securities Exchange Act
§ 6(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1976)(SEC power to set security exchange rules). Foreign issu-
ers must request entry into the NASDAQ system and two marketmakers must agree to make
a market for the stock. The foreign issuer must provide disclosure similar to that required by
the exchanges. H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 8, at § 3.02[2]; Stephens, supra note 17, at 509.
19 Institutional investors purchase the majority in value of foreign equity. Coles, supra
note 11, at 310; Thomas, supra note 2, at 161.
20 See Thomas, supra note 2, at 163-66; Coles, supra note 11, at 3 10. See also note 13 supra.
21 Individual investors accounted for 62.5% of the shares and 50.2% of the market value
of foreign securities traded in the United States during the fourth quarter of 1980. Thomas,
supra note 2, at 162.
22 Id.
23 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77bbbb (1976).
24 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78111 (1976).
25 The SEC's definition of a foreign private issuer is subject to the qualification that the
issuer cannot be essentially similar to a United States corporation. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-4(c)
(1982). A foreign corporation will be treated as a United States corporation if-
1) more than 50 percent of the outstanding voting securities of such issuer are held
of record either directly or through voting trust certificates or depositary receipts by
residents of the United States; and (2) the business of such issuer is administered
principally in the United States or 50 percent or more of the members of its Board
of Directors are residents of the United States.
17 C.F.R. § 249.220f(2) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(e) (1982).
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standard for foreign securities.26 Noting the history of foreign secur-
ity abuses, Congress rejected the proposal because it apparently felt a
double standard might impair the investor protection sought
through disclosure.27
From its inception, the SEC required foreign firms issuing new
securities to conform to substantially the same Securities Act disclo-
sure standards placed on United States issuers.2 8 This attitude espe-
cially handicapped foreign issuers because of their unequal initial
position.29 Many foreign corporations preferred to avoid the rigors of
Securities Act registration and thus, the American markets. As busi-
ness became more international in scope and more foreign firms
wanted to use the United States capital markets, the SEC's Securities
Act disclosure requirements became more of a barrier to the free flow
of international capital.30 The SEC's failure to adequately recognize
the unique position of foreign corporations largely prevented many
foreign corporations from raising capital through new security issues
in the United States.3'
26 SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, STOCK EXCHANGE PRACTICES, S.
REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong. 2d Sess., 125 (1934)(noting a history of foreign security abuses);
Hearings on the Sale of Foreign Bonds or Securities in the United States Before the Senate Comm on
Finance, 72d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 (1931-1932).
27 Id
28 The SEC made ad hoc accommodations with foreign issuers but generally required
that all material information be disclosed to the same extent as United States corporations
would be required to disclose for similar offerings. See Stephens, Reevaluation of Disclosure Re-
quirements for Foreign Issuers: Securities Act of 1933, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 135, 143-64 (1977).
See also Note, Impact of United States Securities Laws on the Distribution and Trading of Foreign Securi-
ties, 12 INT'L LAw. 133, 146-48 (1978); Bodolus, Internationalization of the Securities Markets, 29
Bus. LAW. 107, 112 (1974).
29 Foreign issuers face an entirely different regulatory climate in their country of incor-
poration. For example, financial statements are prepared to meet non-United States gener-
ally accepted accounting standards. Stephens, supra note 28, at 146-56. Information the SEC
seeks is often considered extremely sensitive by the foreign corporation. For example, some
foreign corporations maintain large hidden reserves due to the ability of shareholders to de-
clare dividends. Id at 149. See generaly Symposium, Developments in Harmonization ofAccounting
Standards, 3 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 373 (1981); Project, International Securities Project,
30 Bus. LAw. 585 (1975); DeBruyne, Global Standards: A Tower of Babel, 48 FIN. ExEC. 30
(1980).
30 The United States has traditionally been a strong advocate of free trade. Part of this
theory has been the "[a]dmission of foreign securities on domestic capital markets." ORGANI-
ZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, CODE OF LIBERALIZATION OF
CAPITAL MOVEMENTS, Annex A, List A § 3 (March 1982). The SEC has often stated that
the free flow of international capital is one of its goals. 46 Fed. Reg. 58,513 (1981).
31 It is very difficult to quantify how many foreign issuers are kept out of the United
States capital markets by the SEC's actions. However, it is indicative that from 1971 to 1980
foreigners purchased $25.8 billion of United States stocks while American investors purchased
only $2.5 billion of foreign stocks. Likewise, foreigners purchased $70.8 billion of United
States bonds while American investors purchased only $34.3 billion of foreign bonds.
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Foreign issuers could avoid Securities Act liability, however, by
ensuring that no security came to rest, through the initial distribu-
tion, in the United States.3 2 Secondary trading could then infuse the
security into the United States markets. This secondary trading is,
however, subject to Exchange Act requirements, enacted to ensure
that adequate information is available concerning securities traded
in United States markets.33 The Exchange Act requires any foreign
corporation with more than one million dollars in assets and five
hundred worldwide security holders, or any foreign corporation hav-
ing a security listed on a national securities exchange, to disclose cer-
tain information.3 4
In the Exchange Act, Congress gave the SEC the authority to
make exemptions for foreign issuers, as the SEC deemed appropriate,
in the public interest and in the interest of investor protection. 35
Under this authority, the SEC entirely exempted any foreign corpo-
ration that did not have at least three hundred American security
holders. 36 The SEC also exempted from Exchange Act registration
foreign corporations that sent the SEC any documents which the cor-
poration sent to other governments, security exchanges, or its share-
holders (the information-supplying exemption). 37  Despite the
information-supplying exemption and its low disclosure require-
ments, many foreign corporations without substantial United States
contacts simply ignored the SEC.38 Jurisdictional limitations and
Thomas, supra note 2, at 186-7. See also Willingham, Estimating Foreign Holdings of US Equi-
ties, 7 SEC. INDUS. TRENDS 1 (June 18, 1981).
32 Securities Act of 1933 § 4(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1976). See SEC Securities Act Rel.
No. 4708 (July 9, 1964), 29 Fed. Reg. 828 (1964).
33 15 U.S.C. § 78b. Most developed nations base their systems of investor protection on
some type of disclosure mechanism. Project, supra note 29; Pozen, Disclosure and Trading in an
International Securities Market, 15 INT'. LAw. 84 (1981); Pierce, The Regulation of the Issuance and
Trading of Securities in the United States and the European Economic Community: A Comparison, 3 J.
COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 129 (1981). But see Widmer, The US Securities Laws-Banking
Law of the World?, 1 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 39 (1978).
34 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(b), 15 U.S.C. § 781(b) (1976); id § 12 (g), 15
U.S.C. § 781(g) (1976).
35 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12 (g)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(3) (1976).
36 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(a)(1) (1977). ADR holders are counted as holders of the un-
derlying security. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g5-1(b) (1977). However, the American bank sponsor-
ing the ADR need only report the total number of ADRs outstanding. SEC Form S-12, 2
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 7,252 (1982). Thus, the SEC is often unaware when the requisite
300 American shareholders acquire the security. See Tomlinson, supra note 4, at 487; S. REP.
No. 379, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 30 (1963).
37 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(b)(1) (1977). Approximately 110 foreign issuers were relying
on the information-supplying exemption on August 13, 1982. SEC Exchange Act Rel. No.
19,117 (Oct. 12, 1982), 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 23,317 (1982).
38 See Tomlinson, supra note 4, at 487-8. See also SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND
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lack of information available to the SEC made the Exchange Act
provisions largely unenforceable against foreign corporations with
minimal United States contacts.39
In contrast, foreign corporations that actively encouraged trade
in their securities, for example, by listing a security on a national
exchange or by having made a previous Securities Act issuance of
new stock, could be effectively required to conform to a higher disclo-
sure standard.4° The SEC, however, required the foreign corpora-
tions seeking out the United States markets to make minimal
disclosure.4 ' The foreign corporation had to initially file under the
Exchange Act, make a minimal annual disclosure statement, and
provide interim disclosure reports concerning information supplied
to the press, foreign governments, or its security holders.42
As American investors became more interested in foreign securi-
ties and as more foreign securities found their way into United States
markets,43 the SEC's Exchange Act disclosure requirements became
increasingly untenable. More American broker/dealers began to sell
foreign securities, and banks began to issue more ADRs which made
foreign security ownership less onerous." Yet the Exchange Act reg-
ulatory scheme provided little, if any, information on most foreign
CURRENCY, SECURmIEs AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION LEGISLATION, S. REP. No. 379, 88th
Cong., 1st. Sess., 29 (1963) (reflecting concern over enforceability of United States security
laws); Hearings On H.A 6789, H. 6793, And S. 16112, Before a Subcomm. of The House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 179 (1963).
39 Tomlinson, supra note 4, at 487-8. See also Johnson, Application of Federal Securities Laws
to International Securities Transactions, 45 ALBANY L. REv.890 (1981) and sources therein; note
66 infra.
40 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(c)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 781(k) (1976)(10 day trading
ban for any over-the-counter security); id 19(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 781(d) (1976)(power to delist a
security from a national exchange); id § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1976) (power to investigate); id.
§ 32, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1976)(criminal penalty for willful violation); id § 15(b)(4), 15 U.S.C.
§ 781() (1976)(prohibit broker/dealers from dealing in the security).
4i See Stephens, sufira note 17, at 519-24; SEC Exchange Act Rel. No. 16;371, 44 Fed.
Reg. 70,133 (1979).
42 SEC Form 20, 17 C.F.R. § 249.220 (1976), 4 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 29,621
(1976)(initial filing); SEC Form 20-K, 17 C.F.R. § 249.320 (1976), 4 FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 32,221 (1976)(annual disclosure); SEC Form 6-K, 17 C.F.R. § 249.306 (1976), 4
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 30,971 (1979)(interim disclosure similar to that required by the
information-supplying exemption).
43 In 1981, American residents participated in $22,978 million of foreign equity transac-
tions and $37,960 million of foreign debt transactions. U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, TREASURY
BULL. 103 (July 1982). These figures include transactions in Canadian securities.
44 The ADR bank typically performs such valuable services as acting as transfer agent,
collecting dividends or interest, converting foreign currency to dollars, and appraising the
ADR holder of subscription rights and other important corporate developments. See Tomlin-
son, supra note 4, at 465-6.
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securities traded in the secondary markets.45
Thus, the SEC required too little disclosure from those foreign
corporations whose securities were actively traded in United States
secondary markets. American investors consequently did not receive
the protection the Exchange Act was meant to provide.46 On the
other hand, the SEC required too much disclosure from foreign cor-
porations seeking to issue new securities in the United States. 47 The
Securities Act regulations thus prevented the free flow of capital in
an expanding international economy.
III. The SEC's Recent Regulatory Response
A. The Exchange Act Regulations
In 1977, the SEC significantly reevaluated its foreign issuer Ex-
change Act requirements. 48 Originally, the proposed changes would
have required many foreign issuers to fulfill substantially the same
disclosure requirements as United States corporations. 49 By not tak-
ing into account the special circumstances of foreign issuers, the SEC
threatened to make the same mistake under the Exchange Act which
it had made under the Securities Act. A high disclosure standard
would largely prevent foreign corporations from encouraging a
United States secondary market. This would reduce the investment
opportunities available to the American investor. In addition, for-
eign issuers willing to meet the high Securities Act disclosure require-
ments during the initial distribution would be faced with continuing
high Exchange Act disclosure requirements. This would further dis-
courage willing foreign issuers from entering the United States capi-
tal markets.
The rules finally adopted under the Exchange Act indicate a
new SEC attitude toward foreign corporations.50 Rather than taking
a parochial American stand and concentrating solely on protecting
American investors, the SEC kept in mind the need to maintain a
free flow of international capital and the public interest in affording
45 See Stephens, supra note 17, at 516-34.
46 See text accompanying notes 35-42 supra
47 See Coles, supra note 11, at 110; Note, supra note 28.
48 SEC Exchange Act Release No. 14128 (Nov. 2, 1977), [1977-1978 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 81,361 (1977).
49 Id See also Pozen, supra note 33, at 85; Coles, supra note 11, at 318 (foreign issuers
showed great concern).
50 SEC Exchange Act Rel. No. 16,371, 44 Fed. Reg. 70,132 (1979)(codified at 17 C.F.R.
§§ 240.3a12-3, 240.13a-16, 240.15d-16, 249.220f, 249.306 (1982)). See also note 30 supra.
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American investors a wide range of investment opportunities. 5' The
SEC considered disclosure standards developed by international or-
ganizations and foreign governments, and modified its requirements
where its standards differed radically from foreign practice. 52 The
SEC noted its action was "an important step . . . in the harmoniza-
tion of international disclosure standards.153
The new rules center on form 20-F, a registration and annual
disclosure form.54 The new form requires more disclosure than the
old Exchange Act disclosure form but less than the form used by
United States corporations. The major concessions to foreign corpo-
rations are in the areas of description of business (segment report-
ing),55 management remuneration,5 6 management interest in certain
transactions, 57 and use of generally accepted accounting principles.58
51 Id
52 SEC Exchange Act Rel. No. 16,371, 44 Fed. Reg. 70,132, 70,133 (1979). The SEC
mentions the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the European Eco-
nomic Community, the United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporation, and the
International Accounting Standards Committee. Id Set also notes 55-58 and 87-88 infra.
53 Id at 70,133.
54 SEC Form 20-F, 17 C.F.R. % 249.220(f) (1982).
55 Item 101 of Regulation S-K requires United States corporations to disclose corporate
revenue and profit (or loss) by industry segments. The SEC also requires an extensive narra-
tive description of each industry segment. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101 (1982). Form 20-F requires
disclosure of only corporate revenues by industry segment unless profit (or loss) varies materi-
ally from revenues by industry segment. Should profit (or loss) vary materially from revenue,
the SEC requires only a narrative discussion of its significance and not the disclosure of actual
dollar variance. The narrative description by industry segment is limited to those factors
which may have a material impact on future financial performance. SEC Form 20-F, Item 1,
4 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 29,721 (1982).
56 Item 402 of regulation S-K requires a United States corporation to disclose the
amount of money and other benefits paid to the five most highly compensated officers or
directors individually and all officers and directors as a group. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (1982).
Foreign corporations may respond to this item by disclosing only remuneration paid to all
officers and directors as a group unless the individual information is otherwise disclosed to
security holders or made public. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (1982). See also SEC Securities Act Rel.
No. 6449 (Jan. 17, 1983)(proposed amendment retains prior scheme).
57 Item 404 of regulation S-K requires United States corporations to disclose any mate-
rial management interest in transactions between management and the corporation. 4 FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 71,044 (1982) (effective June 30, 1983). Foreign issuers are not required
to comply with Item 404 at all unless the corporation makes such information public or dis-
closes it to its security holders. Id Current law contains a similar scheme. See SEC Form 20-
F, Item 17, 4 FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) % 29,721 (1979).
58 Regulation S-X describes the various accounting rules to be used by United States
corporations. Regulation S-X generally incorporates United States generally accepted ac-
counting principles. 17 C.F.R. § 210 (1982). Regulation S-X contains a separate regime for
foreign issuers using form 20-F. 5 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) % 61,160 (1982). In addition, the
foreign issuer may use non-United States generally accepted accounting principles if material
variations with United States generally accepted accounting principles are disclosed and, to
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Unlike United States corporations, foreign firms need not file a
quarterly disclosure statement. Instead, the SEC retained the in-
terim reporting scheme but made the information more helpful to
American investors by requiring an English translation.59 The SEC
also retained the information-supplying exemption for foreign corpo-
rations which do not list their securities on a national exchange or
have a security registered under the Securities Act.60 Under the pre-
vious regulations, this exemption allowed foreign corporations whose
securities were actively traded on the NASDAQ system to avoid high
disclosure requirements as long as they did not obtain a national se-
curities exchange listing.61 The foreign corporation therefore could
actively encourage a secondary market without making significant
disclosure. The SEC proposed to remedy this situation in 1982 by
requiring companies whose securities are traded on the NASDAQ
system to comply with the annual disclosure requirement. 62 This
rule will ensure that foreign corporations who seek to develop a
United States secondary market make adequate disclosure and will
also remove the disincentive to seek a national exchange listing.63
The only foreign corporations that will be able to use the infor-
mation-supplying exemption are those whose securities are traded on
the "pink sheet" market.64 This market's current status makes it un-
likely that a foreign corporation could use the market to encourage
trading in its securities.65 Also, three factors weigh against raising the
low level of disclosure required from these foreign corporations.
First, since these foreign corporations have taken no action to de-
velop a United States trading market, the SEC's asserted jurisdiction
the extent practicable, if the effect of the variation is given. 4 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
29,721 (1982).
59 Form 6-K, 17 C.F.R. § 249.306 (1982). The failure to require an English translation
evoked the most criticism of form 6-K. See Stephens, supra note 17, at 526, 538.
60 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(b)(5)(0 (1982).
61 Id
62 SEC Exchange Act Rel. No. 19,187 (Oct. 28, 1982),[1982 Transfer Binder] FED SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 83,272 (1982).
63 See Stephens, supra note 17, at 516.
64 The "pink sheet's" main use is to refer broker/dealers to market-makers in the secur-
ity. The quotations are on a non-current basis so the broker/dealer must contact the market-
maker for the current quotation. H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 8, at 13. Since the market-
maker is not required to make a market, the order may not be executed. Id Since the "pink
sheet" issuers will presumably be left out of the national market system, the inefficiencies in
the market, such as spreads between bid and ask, and non-existent limit orders, can only
increase. Pozen, supra note 50, at 88. The SEC can best control this market through bro-
ker/dealer restrictions. 17 C.F.R. §240.12c2-11(a) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-11(a)(4)
(1982).
65 Id See Stephens, supra note 17, at 516.
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may violate international customary law.66 Second, the SEC en-
forcement mechanisms cannot reach the foreign corporation to re-
quire compliance with any higher standard.67 Third, an SEC-
imposed trading ban would primarily affect the American investor
who seeks a market and reduced trading costs in the United States.68
Some commentators have argued that the SEC should not require
-any disclosure from such issuers since enforcement and jurisdiction
are so problematical.69
B. The Securities Act Regulations
In 1982, the SEC adopted a complex series of rules to liberalize
the treatment of foreign corporations offering new securities to Amer-
ican investors.70 The Securities Act disclosure requirements were in-
tegrated with the Exchange Act's annual disclosure statements and
interim reporting requirements. The integration is not complete be-
cause most foreign corporations will have to provide significantly
greater financial information for certain security offerings than that
required for their Exchange Act annual statement and interim re-
porting obligations.
The SEC created three new Securities Act registration docu-
ments.71 These forms parallel the three forms used by United States
66 The "effects" jurisdictional doctrine of international law provides that "a state may,
under international law, exercise jurisdiction to prescribe and apply its law with respect to
. . . conduct outside its territory which has or is intended to have substantial effect within its
territory . . . ." RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES(REVISED) § 402 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981). See a/so id § 403. Jurisdictional limita-
tions are particularly involved when a foreign corporition has merely passively allowed trad-
ing in its securities in the United States. See Stephens, supra note 17, at 531; Johnson,
Application of Federal Securities Laws to International Securities Transactions, 45 ALBANY L. REV.
890, 900 (1981); Loomis & Grant, The US Securities and Exchange Commission, Financial Institu-
tions Ouside the U S and Extraterritorial Application ofthe US Securities Laws, I J. COMP. CORP.
L. & SEC. REG. 3 (1978). The perceived international application of United States laws in-
creasingly has been met by sharp rebuffs from other nations. Widmer, supra note 33; Gordon,
Extrateitorial Application of United States Economic Laws: Britain Draws the Line, 14 INT'L LAW.
151 (1980); Sornarajah, The Extraterritorial Enforcement of US Antitrust Laws: Conflict and Compro-
mise, 31 INT'L COMp. L.Q. 127 (1982); Pettit & Styles, International Response to the Extrateritorial
Application of United States Antitrust Laws, 37 Bus. LAw. 697 (1982).
67 See Tomlinson, supra note 4, at 487-8. See a/so note 40 supra.
68 See SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COM-
MISSION LEGISLATION, S. REP. No. 379, 88th Cong. 1st Sess. 29 (1963).
69 See Stephens, supra note 17, at 540-4.
70 SEC Securities Act Rel. No. 6437 (Dec. 4, 1982), 47 Fed. Reg. 54,764 (1982); SEC
Exchange Act Rel. No. 19,258 (Dec. 4, 1982), 47 Fed. Reg. 54,764 (1982).
71 SEC Form F-1, 47 Fed. Reg. 54,771 (1982), 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 6038D;
SEC Form F-2, 47 Fed Reg. 54,773 (1982), 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 6038E; SEC Form
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corporations in the domestic integrated disclosure system. 72 The
proper form to be filed depends on the issuer, the issue, the issuer's
prior reporting experience, and the issuer's use of a prior annual dis-
closure statement. Additionally, for certain issues, some issuers must
disclose financial information substantially identical to that required
from United States corporations. The minimal disclosure form, form
F-3, can be used only by "world-class" issuers reporting with the SEC
for at least three years.73 The SEC defines a "world-class" issuer as a
foreign corporation with more than three hundred million dollars of
value in voting securities held by non-affiliates worldwide.74 The
"world-class" issuer can integrate the annual Exchange Act financial
disclosure for offerings to security holders or for offerings of invest-
ment grade nonconvertible debt. Form F-3 can be used for other
security offerings but must include financial information identical to
that required of United States corporations.
The intermediate disclosure form, form F-2, can be used by a
foreign corporation which has either filed one prior annual disclosure
statement or reported to the SEC for three years, but only for offers
to existing security holders. 75 The SEC does not require increased
financial disclosure for this type of offer. Form F-2 may be used for
other offerings only if the issuer has reported to the SEC for three
years or is a "world-class" issuer who has filed one prior annual dis-
closure statement.76 These offerings, however, require the increased
financial disclosure.
The highest disclosure form, form F- 1, must be used for all other
offers including exchange offers. 77 Foreign issuers required to use this
form include: corporations making shareholder offerings who have
neither reported for three years nor filed one annual disclosure state-
ment; corporations making other offerings who have not reported for
three years; and "world-class" issuers making nonshareholder offer-
F-3, 47 Fed. Reg. 54,776 (1982), 2 FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 6038F. Adopted in SEC
Securities Act Rel. No. 6437 (Dec. 4 1982), 47 Fed. Reg. 54,764 (1982).
72 SEC Forms S-1, S-2, and S-3, 17 C.F.R. 239.11 - 239.13 (1982). These forms were
altered or adopted in SEC Securities Act Release No. 6383 (May 24, 1982), 47 Fed. Reg.
11,380 (1982). See Greene, Integration of the Securities Act and The Exchange Act: A Case Study of
Regulation in the Division of Corporation Finance of the United States Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, 3 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEc. REG. 75 (1981); Note, Securities Regulation: Integration of
Securities Oferings, 34 OKLA. L. REv. 864 (1982).
73 47 Fed. Reg. 54,776 (1982)(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 239.33).
74 47 Fed. Reg. 54,777 (1982)(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 239.33a-4).
75 47 Fed. Reg. 54,773 (1982)(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 239.32b-1).
76 47 Fed. Reg. 54,773 (1982)(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 239.32b-2).
77 47 Fed. Reg. 54,771 (1982)(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 239.31a).
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ings who have neither reported for three. years nor filed a prior an-
nual disclosure statement.78 The high disclosure form requires
higher financial disclosure for all issues except offerings to existing
security holders.
Looking at the entire regulatory scheme, only a "world-class"
issuer offering investment-grade nonconvertible debt can completely
incorporate the Exchange Act's annual and interim disclosure with
the Securities Act's requirements for a nonshareholder offering. All
other corporations and security offerings must meet the more strenu-
ous financial disclosure standard which requires information identi-
cal to that required from United States corporations. While some
individual investors may benefit from greater access to such debt, the
action seems aimed at providing competition to the Eurobond mar-
ket which is dominated by institutional investors.79 The SEC's em-
phasis on requiring United States accounting techniques and
information for these other issues presents the most severe hurdle for
foreign issuers.80 It keeps many foreign issuers out of United States
capital markets and thus impedes the free flow of international
capital."'
The SEC defends the increased financial disclosure on two
grounds. First, the increased disclosure protects the American inves-
tor.8 2 Second, certain requirements, especially segment accounting,
are becoming popular techniques in international disclosure
practice.83
Any accommodations the SEC reaches with foreign issuers result
in lowered United States investor protection. Some commentators,
suggesting that investor protection is paramount, argue that the is-
suer should have to meet all United States disclosure requirements if
it wants to sell securities in the United States. 84 The SEC has not
adopted this view, preferring instead to balance investor protection
with concern for the free flow of international capital and the inves-
tor's interest in having a wide range of investment opportunities.8 5
The SEC does assess the voluntariness of the issuer's acts in apprais-
78 Id.
79 See Coles, sufpra note 11, at 110; Stephens, sufira note 28, at 140. See aso Pozen, supra
note 50, at 87.
80 Id.
81 See note 31 supra.
82 47 Fed. Reg. 54,765 (1982).
83 46 Fed. Reg. 58,513 (1981).
84 Brownell, Legal Problems of Issuing and Marketing Foreign Securities in the United States,
INT'L FIN. & INV. 430, 446 (J. McDaniels ed. 1964)(comments of former SEC Chairman
Cohen).
85 See note 30 supra.
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ing the appropriate disclosure standard.86 The issuance of new secur-
ities under a Securities Act registration is clearly voluntary, and the
SEC has responded by keeping very high disclosure standards for
most foreign issuers. Unfortunately, this response will continue to
prevent many foreign issuers from entering the United States capital
markets.
The SEC has also justified the higher financial disclosure stan-
dards as in keeping with developing international disclosure prac-
tice. 7 However, the SEC has failed to distinguish between the
aspirations of international organizations and the actual disclosure
standards required by nations. For example, the International Ac-
counting Standards Committee's pronouncements have no legal
force and apparently little persuasive effect on national accounting
professions or national legislatures.88 Likewise, although the Euro-
pean Economic Community has begun a program to require disclo-
sure similar to that now required by the SEC, actual implementation
appears to be many years in the future.89 Thus, the SEC is leading
the way to increased international disclosure at the price of reduced
international flow of capital and decreased investment opportunities
in the United States.
86 46 Fed. Reg. 54,512 (1981). See also Thomas, supra note 2, at 158.
87 Id at 58,513. The SEC mentioned the European Economic Community, the Interna-
tional Accounting Standards Committee, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development and the United Nations.
88 INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS COMMITTEE, INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNT-
ING STANDARD No. 14: REPORTING FINANCIAL INFORMATION BY SEGMENT (Aug. .1981);
INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS COMMITTEE, INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING
STANDARD No. 15: INFORMATION REFLECTING THE EFFECTS OF CHANGING PRICES (Nov.
1981); INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS COMMITTEE, INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNT-
ING STANDARD No. 16: ACCOUNTING FOR PROPERTY, PLANT AND EQUIPMENT (March
1982). Various studies indicate that the International Accounting Standards Committee has
little or no influence on national accounting practice. Choi & Bavishi, Financial Accounting
Standards: A Multinational Synthesis and Poli Framework, 18 INT'L J. ACCT. 159 (1982); Evans &
Taylor, "Bottom Line Compliance" with the IASC A Comparative Anal sis, 18 INT'L J. AccT. 115
(1982).
89 The Fourth Directive on Annual Accounts, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L. 222)1(1978);
The Sixth Directive on Company Law Harmonization, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L.
100)1(1980); The Seventh Directive Concerning Group Accounts(Proposed), 22 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. C. 14)2(1979). A Council Directive is binding on member States only as to the
result to be achieved and therefore must generally be implemented by national legislation.
Treaty Establishing The European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, art. 189, 298
U.N.T.S. 3. But see Easson, "Direct Effect" of EEC Directives, 28 INT'L COMP. L.Q.319, 334-7
(1979). Several years may pass between the adoption of a Council Directive and its imple-
mentation by the member States. Easson, supra at 349-51. Therefore, the gap between
aspiration and reality is often substantial. See also Pozen, supra note 50, at 86; Coles, supra
note 11, at 316.
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IV. Conclusion
The SEC has taken several steps in the last few years to accom-
modate foreign issuers. The simplified Exchange Act annual disclo-
sure form and Securities Act integration should increase the
availability of foreign issues in the United States. While the SEC has
tried to balance competing interests, the recent integration efforts
seem geared to make the United States markets more competitive
with the Eurobond market. The United States investor would be
better served by a system that would not discourage foreign offerings
and that would permit a wider array of investment vehicles.
The SEC should concentrate on increased international disclo-
sure through international cooperation, not merely setting a strict
United States example for the rest of the world. High United States
disclosure requirements interfere with international harmonization
of securities regulation and the free flow of international investment
capital.
Kirk S Schumacher
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